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TRANSNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND HOST




This article explores agricultural export restriction disciplines under
international economic law, mainly international trade and investment laws, in the
particular context of the recent translational race for farmland. A number of
reasons justify this undertaking. Firstly, the use of export restrictions of various
sorts by a number of countries in response to the food price spikes in 2007-2008
exacerbated the food crisis. Part of the explanation for this pervasive use of export
restrictions is that the World Trade Organization ("WTO") law discipline on
export restrictions is too weak to restrain exporting countries from introducing and
maintaining these measures. As such, agricultural export restrictions have gained
some attention in various regional and globalfora that have been calling for tighter
disciplines, although to date there is little progress to this effect. Secondly,
agricultural export restriction measures have also been one of the push factors for
increasing acquisition of farmland abroad in recent years. Indeed, many of these
land deals target either food security of home states (export back home), or
generating stable profit through, among others, secure access to international
markets. Hence, possible export restriction measures by host states, even when
dictated by local necessities, would be a counter move to these goals, and likely
lead to tensions between the competing interests of foreign investors and host
states (local communities). This is particularly so in the context of sub-Saharan
African host countries, which are often themselves facing frequent food insecurity
(hunger) challenges.
Admittedly, export restrictions may not be a panacea to ensure food
availability in local markets, let alone access at household level.' Thus, it may be
argued that so long as there are alternative sources of food supply, mainly the
international market, the emphasis on export restrictions is a misplaced concern.
2
. PhD Candidate, Melbourne Law School (gfura@student.unimelb.edu.au); an earlier version of this
article was presented at the American Society of International Law's International Economic Law
Interest Group 2014 Biennial Research Conference held at the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law Denver, Colorado, November 13-15, 2014; I would like to thank the participants of the Conference
for stimulating questions and comments. I am also grateful to Jtirgen Kurtz and Sundhya Pahuja for
their thoughtful comments on earlier draft of sections of this work, and the editorial team of the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy for the meticulous edits; any mistakes are, however, mine.
1. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION
(1981) (demonstrating that nationwide food availability does not necessarily translate into household
food access).
2. See Siddhartha Mitra & Tim Josling, Agricultural Export Restrictions: Welfare Implications
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But, given that it is the lack of confidence on the international market that has in
the first place propelled importing (investor) countries to acquire land abroad, there
would hardly be an overriding logic that assures the reliability of this same market
for host states. Indeed, at times, export restriction maybe one of the only few
policy options available to host states.
Despite the increasing attention agricultural export restrictions have gained in
recent years, and the complex issues the potential application of these measures to
foreign agricultural investments may involve, the existing literature tends to focus
more on WTO law and less on how WTO law interact with the disciplines existing
under other strands of international economic law, notably international investment
law. 3 This work is an attempt to address this gap in the existing body of literature.
The article makes a claim that despite the relatively loose WTO discipline on
export restrictions and hence the increasing call for tighter disciplines in recent
years, transnational national agricultural investments, which are further subject to
international investment law, are already subject to tighter export restriction
disciplines in a manner that inhibits hosts states policy space to respond even to
local hunger.
The article is organized as follows. Following this introductory section, part
II will provide for the general context in which these farmland acquisitions are
happening; noting that food security (food demand) in home states is a
significant-if not necessarily the principal-driver of these investments, and
highlighting the relevance of export restrictions measures to foreign agricultural
investments in sub-Saharan Africa host states often facing hunger challenges such
as Ethiopia. Part III will explore this ability of host (exporting) states under the
WTO laws, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade( "GATT
1994") and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) and jurisprudence. This paper
will demonstrate that in the light of indeterminate and subjective nature of the key
terms defining the conditions that might justify recourse to export restriction
measures, weak procedural requirements that can easily be eschewed, and the
absence of limit to the use of export taxes (that otherwise have similar effect to
quantitative restrictions), the WTO leaves member states with adequate room to
introduce agricultural export restriction measures. Part IV will analyse how WTO
law interacts with international investment law in disciplining export restrictions.
The article concludes, in part V, that in the context of transnational agricultural
investments, WTO law flexibilities on export restrictions on ground of food
security would be diminished when read in the light of relevant disciplines under
international investment law and practice, inhibiting host states ability to respond
and Trade Disciplines I (IPC Position Paper, 2009),
http://agritrade.org/documents/ExportRestrictions-final.pdf (noting that "export restrictions - in the
long as well as the short run - lead to a deterioration of welfare in both the country imposing such
measures and the rest of the world.").
3. See, e.g., ROBERT HOWSE & TIM JOLING, AGRICULTURAL EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A WAY FORWARD 21-22 (Int'l Food & Agricultural Trade Pol'y Council
ed., 2012) ("[C]onsideration also needs to be given to the disciplines [on agricultural export restrictions]
that currently exist in regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties.").
VOL. 43:4
2015 TRANSNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS 591
to even local hunger.
I. TRANSNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS: THE CONTEXT
A spike in food prices of 2007 (which escalated even further in 2008) made
food unaffordable in many countries, and sparked a wave of 'food riots' in over
forty countries.4 In response, some importing countries engaged in 'panic
purchasing' of grains while others attempted to negotiate long-term grain supply
agreements with exporting countries.5 On the other hand, a number of grain
exporting countries began introducing export restriction measures partly to limit
food prices inflation at home 6 -producing a growing realisation that the global
market was no longer reliable source of food. This propelled relatively rich
countries with shortage of arable land and water to outsource food production
through purchase or lease of farmland abroad.7 In addition, the rise in the price of
oil during the same period and policy responses to climate change imperatives
resulted in considerable demand for alternative and renewable sources of energy,
such as biofuel, which further contributed to the increasing demand of arable land.8
Also, as a result of the global financial crisis, investments in land (agriculture)
were 'rediscovered' as 'safer' ventures. 9 Thus, the convergence of global food,
energy (fuel) and financial crises-so called "the triple-F crisis' 10 -of recent
years triggered the increasing acquisitions of farmland mainly in the global South
and most notably in sub-Saharan Africa 1 by both foreign private investors and
4. Editorial, The Food Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, at A26,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/opinion/25fri2.html? r-0.
5. See PAUL MCMAHON, THE FEEDING FRENZY: THE NEW POLITICS OF FOOD (2013)
[hereinafter MCMAHON].
6. See Howard Mann & Carin Smaller, Foreign Land Purchases for Agriculture: What Impact
on Sustainable Development?, SUSTAINABLE DEV. INNOVATION BRIEFS 2, Jan. 2010,
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/no8.pdf (nothing that "at least 25 countries
imposed export bans or restrictions in 2008"); see MCMAHON, supra note 5 (explaining that "as a
number of countries resorted to such measures, no one country was on the 'high moral ground' to
challenge the legality of the measures"). Arguably such measures could be justified under GATT and
the Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO. Later sections of this article will argue that the situation will
most likely be different if the food (grain) belongs to foreign investors as in the case of transnational
agricultural investments.
7. See GRAIN, SEIZED! THE 2008 LAND GRAB FOR FOOD AND FINANCIAL SECURITY (2008),
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-financial-security.
8. Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and The Politics of Food, 49 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 101,109, 112 (2013).
9. See KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., WORLD BANK, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN
IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? xxv (2011) ("[T]ogether with the reduced
attractiveness of other assets due to the financial crisis, the boom led to a 'rediscovery' of the
agricultural sector by different types of investors and a wave of interest in land acquisitions in
developing countries.").
10. RUTH HALL, LAND GRABBING IN AFRICA AND THE NEW POLITICS OF FOOD (David Hughes
ed., Future Agrics. 2011).
11. DEININGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 51 (noting that out of the 56.6 million hectares of land
deals reported between 2008 and 2009, two-thirds of the total area, 39.7 million hectares, involves sub-
Saharan Africa). The Land Matrix, on the other hand, reported that out of the 33.9 million hectares of
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sovereign wealth funds, 12 a phenomenon often infamously referred to as 'land
grabs.'
1 3
At the receiving end too, host states are not passive partners. Indeed, they
have long been courting for large scale investment in agriculture through a series
of measures ranging from the waves of land law reforms to incentives of various
sorts, although it now appears that only the recent global 'crises' induced such
investments than those incentives. 14 The often-claimed potential benefits of these
investments to host states include enhanced food security, employment
opportunity, and access to new farm technologies, export earnings, and
development goals in general. 15 Yet, whether these investments deliver on those
counts, 16 or even, whether host governments are 'neutral' agents promoting the
interest of their people in this process is quite contentious. Indeed, it appears that
the discontents against these land deals in different parts of the world speak to
land deals between 2008 and 2011, 60% happened in sub-Sub-Saharan Africa. See The Online Public
Database on Land Deals, LAND MATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/en/ (last updated Nov. 25, 2014).
While the emerging literature on the recent farmland deals generally point to an increasing trend, the
actual size of land transferred to investors, however, is far from certainty. The computation of the scale
of land deals draws heavily on official documents, which reveal only a small percentage of such deals
and/or media reports, which tend to overstate the deals; as such creating a sense of "false precision."
See generally Ian Scoones et al., The Politics of Evidence: Methodologies for Understanding the Global
Land Rush, 40 J. PEASANT STUD. 469 (2013), and Carlos Oya, Methodological Reflections on "Land
Grab " Databases and the "Land Grab" Literature "Rush ", 40(3) J. PEASANT STUD. 503, 506 (2013).
12. LAND MATRIX, supra note 11. According to the latest report by the Land Matrix, a
partnership of civil society and intergovernmental organizations, the top ten investor countries are:
United States, Malaysia, Singapore, Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, India, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia,
Brazil, and China. Id.
13. Matias Marguis, Nora Mackeon & Satumino Morras, Land Grabbing and Global Governance
Critical Perspectives, 10 GLOBALIZATIONS 1, 2 (2013) (recognizing that the term "land-grabbing" is
originally employed by Karl Marx); see Int'l Land Coalition, International Conference and Assembly of
Members, May 24-27, 2011, Tirana Declaration: Securing Land Access for the Poor in Times of
Intensified Natural Resources Competition (May 27, 2011), http://www.landcoalition.org/fr/node/ 109
(defining land grabbing in a contemporary context). Other terms associated with the increasing
transnational land acquisitions in recent years include: large scale land acquisitions, global land rush,
enclosures, green rush, green grabbing global farm race, and agro-imperialism.
14. See AMBREENA S. MANJI, THE POLITICS OF LAND REFORM IN AFRICA: FROM COMMUNAL
TENURE TO FREE MARKETS (2006). See also PATRICK MCAUSLAN, LAND LAW REFORM IN EAST
AFRICA, TRADITIONAL OR TRANSFORMATIVE?: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 50 YEARS OF LAND LAW REFORM
IN EASTERN AFRICA 1961-2011 (2013).
15. See generally THE GLOBAL FARM RACE: LAND GRABS, AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT, AND
THE SCRAMBLE FOR FOOD SECURITY (Michael Kugelman & Susan L. Levenstein eds. 2013); Olivier De
Schutter, How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in
Farmland, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 249 (2011); Narla, supra note 8.
16. E.g., DEINtNGER ET AL., supra note 9. The World Bank's report, for example, while noting the
potential opportunities farmland investment presents for both investors and host states (even local
people) found that "in many cases, potential benefits from such [large scale farmland] transfers are not
realized or outweighed by negative impacts." Id. at 5. FAO's report also notes that, "While a number
of studies document the negative impacts of large-scale land acquisition in developing countries, there
is much less evidence of its benefits to the host country, especially in the short term and at local level."
FAO, TRENDS AND IMPACTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY AGRICULTURE:
EVIDENCE FROM CASE STUDIES 336(2012), http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i31l2e/i31l2e.pdf.
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these doubts. In 2008, for instance, the South Korean business group Daewoo
Logistics attempted to lease for ninety-nine years 1.3 million hectares of land
(roughly a quarter of the country's arable land) from the Malagasy government to
produce rice to be exported back to Korea, despite Madagascar's dependence on
U.N. food aid. 17 A popular riot against the deal culminated in the overthrow of
Madagascar's President Marc Ravalomanana-the new government axed the deal
in March 2009.18 Similar discontents have been reported in many other countries,
including those in sub-Saharan Africa region.
19
While land acquisitions abroad have historical roots in imperial expansions
20
and colonial plantations, in contrast to their historical antecedents, the recent
transnational land acquisitions are occurring at scale and pace not seen before, and
center on production of staple foods and biofuels or simply speculation. While
food and biofuel are regarded as significant drivers of the recent transnational land
21
acquisitions, their respective share is far from clear. Indeed, food and biofuel
production are competing drivers. Whereas the early 'land grabs' reports presented
food as a major driver, some recent works point to biofuels as the major driver. For
example, the World Bank's Policy Research Working Paper, titled What Drives the
Global "Land Rush"?, documents "[d]ependence on food imports emerges as a
strong driver of demand for land acquisition. 22 On the other hand, according to the
17. Rivo ANDRIANIRINA RATSIALONANA ET AL., INT'L LAND COALITION, AFTER DAEWOO?:




18. LORENZO COTULA & SONJA VERMEULEM, INT'L INST. FOR ENV'T & DEV., 'LAND GRABS' IN
AFRICA: CAN THE DEALS WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT? 4 (Sept. 2009),
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/7069IIED.pdf.
19. See SOC. DEV. INTEGRATED CTR., KILLING FOR BANANA: GOVERNMENT LAND GRAB,
VIOLENCE AND THE FORGOTTEN RIGHTS OF OGONI FARMERS (2013),
http://saction.orgibooks/Killingfor Banana_2013.pdf. For example, the acquisition of farmland in
Ethiopia by foreign investors has also aroused considerable resentment (and even violence) in some
parts of the country. In Nigeria, the acquisition of land by a Mexican company led to clashes between
the local people and government agents culminating in inter-community violence and killings. See,
e.g., Jason Mosley, Gambella Violence and Land Deals: A Link?, FOCUS ON THE HORN (June 18, 2012,
7:00 AM), http://focusonthehomrn.wordpress.com/2012/06/I8/gambella-violence-and-land-deals-a-link/;
see also, Anywaa Survival Org., Ethiopia: Land Grabs Are Fueling Violence in Gambela, FARM LAND
GRAB (Feb. 22, 2011), http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/20069.
20. See Derek Byerlee, Are We Learning from History?, in THE GLOBAL FARM RACE: LAND
GRABS, AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR FOOD SECURITY 21 (Michael Kugelman
& Susan Levestein eds., 2013); Nancy Lee Peluso & Christian Lund, New Frontiers of Land Control:
Introduction, 38(4) J. PEASANT STUD. 667 (2011),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf! 0.1080/03066150.2011.607692; Liz Alden Wily, Looking Back to
See Forward: The Legal Niceties of Land Theft in Land Rush 39 J. PEASANT STUD. 751 (2012); Charles
Geisler, New Terra Nullius Narratives and the Gentrification of Africa's "Empty Lands ", 18 J. WORLD-
SYSTEMS RES. 15 (2012), http://www.jwsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Geisler-voll 8n1 .pdf.
21. LAND GRABBING AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA (Prosper B. Matondi, Kjell Havnevik &
Atakilte Beyene eds., 2011).
22. Rabah Arezki, Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, What Drives the Global "Land Rush"? 20
(World Bank Pol'y Research, Working Paper No. 5864, 2011),
2015
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Land Matrix database, only about fourteen percent of the land acquisitions in sub-
Saharan Africa are for food production, while non-food production, multipurpose
(several crops in different categories), and flex crops (crops with multiple uses
across food, feed, fuel and industrial purposes) constitute forty-three, thirty, and
thirteen percent respectively.23 As long as the share in the 'multipurpose' and 'flex
crops' is not provided, it is difficult to tell the absolute share of food and biofuel
from the database. The share of the driving factors also differs from country to
country.24 What makes the food-fuel distinction further blurred is also the fact that
some crops officially proposed for biofuel production (non-food category) can
easily be shifted to food (animal feed) depending on the dynamics of demand and
profit-maize and soybean are apt examples here. The converse may not,
however, be the case, since a shift from food to biofuel requires more investment
in processing facilities. At any rate, the more arable land is used for biofuel than
food production, the more pressure and competition over the 'remaining' arable
land for production of food.
Reportedly, the pace of farmland acquisitions has slowed over the last two
years; yet the growing demand for food and biofuel point to further demand for
farmland. The World Bank, for instance, predicts that 18 to 44 million hectares of
land will be required for biofuel production by 2030.25 The U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization ("FAO") also reports that surging global population and
growing demand for food pose major challenges for agriculture as world food
production will need to increase by sixty percent by 2050 while at the same time
coping with a changing climate. 26  Thus, these land deals largely derive their
justificatory power from food security27 although "[t]here is still a lack of
systematic evidence on the food security impacts of agricultural FDI.,,28  It is
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/201 1/wpl 1251 .pdf.
23. LAND MATRIX, surpa note 11.
24. In the case of Ethiopia, for instance, out of thirty-eight farmland deals publicly available, four
land deals (constituting 2/3 of the large scale land acquisitions by foreign investors) are exclusively for
food crops production, while the remaining thirty-four land deals are for the production of either
agricultural raw materials such as cotton or a mix of food and non-food crops. Ministry of Agriculture,
Land Leased Information, FED. DEM. REP. OF ETHIOPIA, http://www.moa.gov.et/web/pages/land-leased
(last visited Apr. 9, 2015). The crops mentioned under the column 'investment type' are the main areas
of investment; but often, the contracts mention for the possibility of growing additional crops which
makes the food vs. non-food distinction difficult. Id.
25. DE1NINGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15.
26. FAO Initiative Brings Global Land Cover Data Under One Rooffor the First Time, FOOD &
AGRIC. ORG. U.N. (Mar. 17, 2014), http://ht.ly/uJSou [hereinafter FAO Report].
27. See, e.g., Maria Cristina Rulli & Paolo D'Odorico, Food Appropriation Through Large Scale
Land
Acquisitions 9 ENT'L RES. LETTERS 1 (2014), http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/9/6/064030/article
(noting that "It is expected that in the long run large scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) for commercial
farming will bring the technology required to close the existing crops yield gaps... and [that up] to
300-550 million people could be fed by crops grown in the acquired land, should these investments in
agriculture improve crop production and close the yield gap.").
28. Jesper Karlsson, Challenges and Opportunities of Foreign Investment in Developing Country
Agriculture for Sustainable Development 3 (FAO Comm. & Trade Pol'y Research, Working Paper No.
48, 2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4074e.pdf.
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therefore imperative to explore the effect of these land deals on host countries and
their communities, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, a region which hosts
the highest proportion of hungry people. 29 One aspect of such undertaking could
be a closer look at the terms on which these land deals take place including what
happens to the produce. This article therefore explores the leverage host states
may have over food produced through transnational agricultural investments by
analysing how international trade and investment laws interact in ordering
potential export restriction measures applicable to these investments.
III. FLEXIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF WTO LAW ON AGRICULTURAL EXPORT
RESTRICTIONS
A. WTO law and jurisprudence
Within international trade law-mainly WTO law-framework, agricultural
export restrictions are disciplined under the GATT 1994,30 the Agreement on
Agriculture ("AoA"), 31 and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures
("TRIPs"). 32  The GATT generally prohibits quantitative import and export
restrictions but, by way of exception, allows members to introduce export
restriction measures, among others, to address critical local food shortages.3 3 The
AoA provides for procedural requirements that a member introducing export
restriction measures shall comply with.34  The TRIPs Agreement, on the other
hand, prohibits trade related investment measure that is inconsistent with GATT
Article III (national treatment) or Article XI (quantitative restrictions).
35
Thus, Article XI:I of the GATT 1994, which provides for a general
elimination of quantitative restrictions in relevant parts, states: "[n]o prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges ... shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation... or on the exportation or
sale for export of any product ..."36 The scope of "prohibitions or restrictions"
envisaged under Article XI is very broad. As the panel in India-Quantitative
Restrictions set out:
[T]he text of Article XI: I is very broad in scope, providing for a general
29. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE
WORLD: THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF FOOD SECURITY 8 (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf (noting that from 2011-2013, sub-Sahara Africa
hosted 222.7 million chronically hungry people (24.8 percent of the total population, which is the
largest proportion in the world)).
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
31. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter AoA].
32. TRIPS Agreement: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, The Legal Texts: The
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 143 (1999), 1868 U.N.T.S. 186
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
33. See GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI(l), XI(2)(a).
34. See AoA, supra note 31, at art. 12.
35. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 2.
36. GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI(I).
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ban on import or export restrictions or prohibitions 'other than duties,
taxes or other charges.' As was noted by the panel in Japan-Trade in
Semiconductors, the wording of Article XI:I is comprehensive: it
applies 'to all measures instituted or maintained by a [Member]
prohibiting or restricting the importation, exportation, or sale for export
of products other than measures that take the form of duties, taxes, or
other charges.' The scope of the term 'restriction' is also broad, as seen
in its ordinary meaning, which is 'a limitation on action, a limiting
condition or regulation.'
37
In principle, therefore, a WTO member may not introduce or maintain any
export (and import) restriction nor prohibition measures (other than duties, taxes or
other charges), even on grounds of food security. By way of exception, however,
as provided under Article XI:2(a), a WTO member is allowed to take "[e]xport
prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting
party. Also, at least arguably, the general exception provisions of the GATT-
Article XX, notably paragraph (j) which allows restrictions that are "essential to
the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply '39-
could also be invoked to justify restriction of exports of products, especially
products which can be used as food or raw material (for example, for production of
biofuel), such as maize and soybean.
In order to justify export "prohibition or restriction" measure on ground of
food security, the measure needs to meet both the substantive requirements of
GATT Article XI:2(a)-including the existence of "critical shortage" of foodstuffs
and the "temporary" application of the measure40-and the procedural
requirements of notification and consultation under AoA Article 12.41 An export
restriction measure that is justified under GATT Article XI:2(a) indiscriminately
applied to both domestic and foreign producers (exporters) in compliance with the
AoA Article 12 shall be deemed to be consistent with the TRIPs, as the latter only
prohibits TRIPs that are inconsistent with the GATT Article III (national
treatment) or Article XI (quantitative restrictions).42
Nonetheless, what constitutes 'critical,' 'shortage,' as well as 'temporarily'
application under GATT 1994, Article XI: 2(a) is far from straightforward. Apart
37. See Panel Report, India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products, 646-47, WT/DS90/AB/R (adopted Sept. 22, 1999),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/90r.pdf.
38. GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI(2)(a).
39. Id. at art. XX.
40. Id. at art. XI:2(a).
41. AoA, supra note 31, at art. 12(1)(b).
42. GATT, supra note 30, at arts. III, XI. Note also that Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement,
which prohibits trade measures is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III and Article XI of GATT
1994. This is further qualified by the introductory phrase explaining that such acts must be taken
"[w]ithout prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994." This is indicative of the fact
that a taken measure which is justified under the exception clauses under GATT must not be
inconsistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
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from a mere reference to the term "food security," neither does the AoA, which
sets the procedural requirements for the application of GATT, nor Article XI:2(a)
provide for precise definition of the conditions that justify the invocation of this
provision. And this omission seems intentional; as for example Smith observes:
"[t]he omission of a definition of food security appears [to be] deliberate and
implies that food security is not a matter for the rules per se, but is something
separate which is to be determined by other international agreements and/pr by the
WTO Member.,
43
There is also no adequate GATT/WTO jurisprudence guiding the
interpretation of GATT Article XI:2(a)-to date, the GATT/IWTO Dispute
Settlement Body considered only few cases relating to export restrictions.4
Among these cases, it is in the China-Raw Materials case that the panel has
directly dealt with some of the key terms under GATT Article XI:2(a), albeit in the
context of raw materials, as opposed to foodstuff. Thus, with regard to what
constitutes 'critical shortage', the Panel ruled that:
The meaning of 'shortage' as a deficiency in the quantity of goods
appears to be common ground with the parties and the Panel also
considers this to be its meaning as used in Article XI:2(a). In the
Panel's view, the term 'critical' indicates that a shortage must be of
'decisive importance' or 'grave,' or even rising to the level of a "crisis"
or catastrophe. Article XI:2(a) states that measures in the form of
restrictions or bans may be used on a temporary basis to either outright
43. Fiona Smith, Food Security and International Agricultural Trade Regulation: Old Problems,
New Perspectives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AGRICULTURE ON THE WTO AGRICULTURE
AGREEMENT 31, 40 (Joseph A. McMahon & Melaku Geboye Desta eds., 2012),
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1307200/l/1307200_FoodSecurityartFinal.pdf. In her article, the author
further notes that "It is then for the Member to decide what is most appropriate for the needs of its
domestic population in food security terms. Whether the policies work and the Members' population
benefits are not relevant considerations for the current international agricultural trade rules." Id.
44. See Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, L/6268-35S/98 GATT B.I.S.D. (adopted Mar. 22, 1988),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/87hersal.pdf, Panel Report, Japan - Trade in Semi-
Conductors, L/6309 - 35S/1 16 (adopted May 4, 1988),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/87semcdr.pdf, Panel Report, Argentina - Measures
Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (adopted Dec.
19, 2000), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList='3185,9556&CurrentCatalogueldlndex=1&FullTextSearch=;
Panel Report, US - Measures Treating Export Restrictions as Subsidies, WT/DS I 94/R (adopted June
29, 2001), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList =108248,44667,80669&C
u rr
entCatalogueI d l ndex= 1 &FullTextS
earch=; Panel Reports, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and
Molybdenum, WT/DS43 l/R, WT/DS433/R, WT/DS433/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2014)
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu-e/431432433r-e.pdf [hereinafter China Rare Earths
Report]; Panel Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
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'prevent' or otherwise 'relieve' such a shortage. 45
The Panel is persuaded by the complainants' argument that the
requirement that measures be applied 'temporarily' contextually informs
the notion of 'critical shortage.' In this sense, as noted by the European
Union, if there is no possibility for an existing shortage ever to cease to
exist, it will not be possible to 'relieve or prevent' it through an export
restriction applied on a temporary basis. If a measure were imposed to
address a limited reserve of an exhaustible natural resource, such
measure would be imposed until the point when the resource is fully
depleted. This temporal focus seems consistent with the notion of
'critical,' defined as 'of the nature of, or constituting, a crisis.'46
Thus, from the reading of China-Raw Materials Panel's report, it transpires
that "critical shortage" refers to a shortage that is of "decisive importance,"
"grave," or of such a nature that amounts to "crisis" although what constitutes
"decisive importance," "grave," or "crisis" begs for further interpretation of
whoever invoking (or challenging) the measure in question.
With regard to the temporality of the measure the panel noted that:
[T]he ordinary meaning of 'temporarily' is 'for a time only' and 'during
a limited time.' The term 'limited time' means 'appointed, fixed' and
'circumscribed within definite limits, bounded, restricted.' These
definitions suggest a fixed time-limit for the application of a measure.
Thus, on its face, Article XI:2(a) would appear to justify measures that
are applied for a limited timeframe to address 'critical shortages' of
'foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting
party.'
47
In the Panel's view, on the basis of textual interpretation, "temporarily"
means "limited timeframe," implying that members' export restriction measures
under Article XI:2(a) shall specify the duration of the measure, precluding
indefinite and long-term export restriction measures. The Panel further
strengthened this textual interpretation with contextual interpretation, maintaining
that otherwise interpretation of "temporarily" under Article XI:2(a) would
undermine the import of GATT Article XX(g).4 8  But in response to China's
appeal, the Appellate Body, while generally upholding the Panel's report, reversed
the Panel's interpretation of the term "temporarily" as "limited time frame, 49




49. Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList=55573,108 7 5 3,96753&CurrentCatalogueldlndex= I &FullTextS
earch=. The Appellate Body argued that, "[W]e disagree that 'temporary' must always connote a time-
limit fixed in advance. Instead, we consider that Article XI:2(a) describes measures applied for a limited
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implying that even long-term export restriction measures could be justified under
GATT Article XI:2(a).
As with most WTO disputes, the taint of protectionism50 seems to have
influenced the Panel's strong legal approach to this case. Although a WTO
adjudicator faced with a true food security crisis may not necessarily approach
Article XI(2) in the same way as the Panel in Raw Materials, given the fact that
this is the first case in which this provision is seriously engaged in the WTO
dispute settlement, it may have important implications for understanding potential
export restriction measures applicable to transnational farmland investments
(produces). As noted before, in most of the sub-Saharan African countries, which
are the principal destinations of the recent farmland investments, food shortage is
rather a perpetual problem. 51  Thus, in the light of the Panel's report, such
shortages may defy the qualification of 'critical shortage' which draws its strength
from the temporality of the problem (that can be prevented or alleviated by
temporarily restricting food exports), making the justification under GATT Article
XI:2(a) difficult, if not impossible. But given the Appellate Body's broad
interpretation of the term "temporarily," it can be contemplated 52 that even long-
term export restriction measures taken in response to the type of incessant food
shortages faced by most of sub-Saharan African countries could be justified under
GATT 1994.
Even when an export restriction measure is prima facie justified under Article
XI:2(a), as noted before, compliance with further procedural requirements under
the AoA is still necessary. Thus, AoA Article 12 requires any Member instituting
new export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs to "give due consideration to the
effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members' food security."
53
Moreover, before instituting such measure, the member shall also notify, in
writing, the Committee on Agriculture as to the nature and duration of the
measure, and shall, upon request, consult with and provide necessary information
to any other member having a substantial interest as an importer with respect to
any matter related to the measure in question.54 A developing country member,
however, is exempted from these requirements unless it is a net-food exporter of
duration, adopted in order to bridge a passing need, irrespective of whether or not the temporal scope of
the measure is fixed in advance." See id. at 331.
50. For example, although China had pleaded for environmental justification (that raw materials
were an exhaustible natural resource and thus restrictions on production/consumption were required), its
measures were not even-handed -it has not reduced levels of domestic consumption of those essential
industrial inputs whose price had dropped significantly with the export restraints. Id. at 5-6.
51. See FAO Report, supra note 25.
52. Although the WTO Dispute Settlement Body does not follow the principle of stare decisis per
se, the practice suggests that panels to some extent, and the Appellate Body to a greater extent, draw on
their prior rulings. WTO, Chapter 7: Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB
Recommendations and Rulings in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE 7.2,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop__.e/dispue/disp_settlement cbt e/c7s2pl_e.htm (last visted Sept.
23, 2015).
53. AoA, supra note 31, art. 12(1)(a) (emphasis added).
54. Id. at art. 12(1)(b).
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the specific foodstuff concerned.5 5 The requirements under AoA Article 12 are,
however, akin to 'soft law' for eschewing these rules does not carry an express
penalty on the concerned exporting country. 6 The experience to date also suggests
that these provisions have not effectively restrained members from using export
restrictions and hence, unlikely will do in the future.5 7
On the other hand, as the China-Raw Materials case suggests, the WTO
discipline on export restriction may not be completely ineffective. As, for
example, Robert Howse and Tim Josling contend on the basis of the outcome of
this case, food exporting countries may not respond to local food crisis in a manner
that is indifferent to the food security impacts on import-dependent countries. 58
They further suggest that there is a room for the WTO to collaborate with another
international organization, which is primarily focused on questions pertaining to
international and national food security 9 to assess the existence of a ground that
justifies export restriction as provided under WTO laws.60 Given the sensitive
nature of hunger (food security) and the protection the agricultural sector has been
accorded historically, however, it may not be easy to conceive that WTO members
would entrust the mandate to determine the existence of "critical shortage of
foodstuff' in their territory to an external body.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that few countries that have recently acceded
to the WTO accepted stricter export restriction commitments, so called "WTO
plus" commitments, 61 the WTO disciplines on export restrictions, including on
ground of food security, remain very loose. This is manifested partly in the
interpretive difficulty of the key, yet indeterminate and subjective, terms-
including "critical," "shortage," and "temporarily"--envisaged under GATT
Article XI:2(a) compounded by the AoA's essentially hortatory procedural
requirements.
But what explains the 'under-regulation' of export restrictions? One
explanation is that, WTO members "did not feel at the time [of the negotiation of
the AoA] there were good reasons to be concerned about the possibility of
countries finding it convenient to restrict their exports." 62 Another explanation has
to do with the prevailing asymmetry of bargaining power among countries during
the Uruguay Round-agricultural trade negotiation remained largely, and firmly, in
the hands of net food exporting developed countries for whom high international
55. Id. at art. 12(2).
56. See, for example, GIOVANNI ANANIA, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURAL EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AND THE WTO: WHAT OPTIONS
DO POLICY-MAKERS HAVE FOR PROMOTING FOOD SECURITY?, ISSUE PAPER NO. 50 (2013).
57. Id. at 17.
58. Howse & Josling, supra note 3, at 2.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. The countries that had to accept obligations which go beyond, to different extents, existing
WTO rules (and hence 'WTO-plus' commitments) include: China, Mongolia, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Ukraine and Vietnam. For more on this see ANANIA, supra note 56, at 1.
62. Id. at 18.
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prices and their impact on food security is a low priority compared to making
markets more open and profitable for their exports.63 It is thus worth considering
what, if any, has changed under the current Doha Round of trade negotiations.
B. The Doha Round Negotiations
Agricultural, and hence food, export restrictions have been the subject of
discussions under Doha Round of Trade Negotiations ("Doha Development
Agenda Round") launched in November 2001.64 Indeed, even before the launch of
the round, several countries, and groups of countries, suggested the need to
introduce more stringent regulations of export restrictions in their initial proposal
on the basis of the AoA inbuilt negotiation agenda (Article 12).65 It is, however,
the food crisis of 2007-2008 which was arguably exacerbated by export restriction
measures of some major exporters that revived the issue in the context of the
agricultural negotiations.
For example, in April 2008, as part of the ongoing effort to find an agreement
which could purportedly bring the Doha Round to an end in later months, Japan
and Switzerland jointly circulated an informal paper calling for stricter WTO rules
on the introduction of export restrictions for food products and on the consultation
and notification procedures. 66 The paper, among other things, proposes that
any new export prohibition or restriction [to] be limited to the extent
strictly necessary for the country imposing it... [taking into account]
production, stocks, and domestic consumption. 67 The proposed rules
[also require] countries seeking to restrict exports to give 'due
consideration' to importers' food security, and look at how trade would
have flowed in the absence of restrictions.
68
Moreover, members need to show how the measure may affect "food aid for
net food-importing developing countries would be affected., 69 Procedurally, the
proposal requires members to a member taking export restriction measure needs to
notify the WTO Committee on Agriculture before instituting export restrictions,
explaining the nature, duration, and reasons for the measures.7" Further,
governments would be required to consult with importers about 'any
63. Id. at 17-8.
64. Id. at 3.
65. See, for instance, the proposal by the Carins Group (including Argentina, Australia, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay,
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay), Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture,
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture - CAIRNS Group Negotiating Proposal, G/AG/NG/W/93 (Dec. 21,
2000). Other countries which tabled initial proposal on export restriction are: Japan, Switzerland, Rep.
Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Jordan.
66. Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Japan, Switzerland Propose Stronger WTO Curbs
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matter related to the proposed' export restriction, and delay the
implementation of the planned measure pending the consultations, 71 and
if the differences cannot be resolved within a certain period of time, the
proposed export restriction would be referred to binding arbitration by a
"standing committee of experts., 72
This proposal was not, however, accepted by WTO members. On the other
hand, the Doha Draft Modalities of 2008 also provides for a modest proposal on
disciplining agricultural export restrictions. 73 The Draft Modalities text would
require members to notify the WTO about the export restrictions, including the
reasons for taking the measure, within ninety days after the imposition of the
measures, and "shall consult, upon request, with any other Member having a
substantial interest as an importer with respect to any matter related to the
proposed measure... and provide, upon request, the interested importing Member
with necessary information, including relevant economic indicators." 74 Export
restrictions would "not normally be longer than [twelve] months" unless otherwise
agreed by "affected importing Members." 75 Nonetheless, despite the increasing
calls for tighter disciplines on export restrictions even within other multilateral
settings 76 -in the face of the impasse of the Doha Round as a whole-there has not
been further progress at the WTO as yet.
Relatedly, a few WTO Members, such as India, have recently embarked on
public stockpiling of grains as a food security strategy77 which has sparked a huge
debate among WTO members-and has almost risked the collapse of the already
shaky Doha Round trade talks. The Indian National Food Security Bill, which was
introduced in 2013, allows the government to buy food, including grains, from
farmers and stockpile it for a public distribution system, where it is sold at
government-run stores at subsidized prices-the subsidy is estimated to be
"available to seventy-five percent of India's rural population and fifty percent of
the urban population." 78  However, some WTO Members, including the United
States and Pakistan, have expressed fears that the scheme runs the risk of
exceeding the ten percent domestic support allowed under the WTO rules, resented
that "India was accumulating too much grain, and that [India] might eventually
release the surplus on the world market, lowering prices for other producers". 79 In
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,
TN/AG/W/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008).
74. Id. . 174. The modalities also include an exemption from these requirements for least-
developed and net food-importing countries.
75. Id. 179.
76. As part of food security discussions since 2007, different levels of stricter export restriction
disciplines have been suggested in multilateral settings such as G-8, G-20, and FAO.
77. USING PUBLIC FOOD GRAIN STOCKS TO ENHANCE FOOD SECURITY, WORLD BANK REPORT
NO. 71280-GLB, 2 (Sep. 2012) [hereinafter USING PUBLIC FOOD].





the face of India's insistence in defending its policy, even threatening to veto the
multilateral agreement on trade facilitation which was part of the Bali Package,
"WTO [M]embers had agreed to a temporary solution in which developing
countries would not be penalized for breaching their subsidy levels until a
permanent solution was found by 2017.''8O If the eventual 'permanent' deal
ensures further tolerance for public stockpiling tied to domestic support, and
thereby extends the level of domestic support currently allowed under the WTO, it
can also in effect allow further export restriction flexibility without the need to
resort to the justification under GATT Article XI:2(a).
IV. THE INTERACTION OF WTO LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN
DISCIPLINING AGRICULTURAL EXPORT RESTRICTIONS
As explained in the preceding section, international trade law offers more
flexibility to exporting states, and hence host states, should they choose to address
local hunger (food security) through export restrictions; and that despite the
increasing attention the disciplining of export restrictions received, no real
agreement towards stricter discipline of export restrictions has been reached in the
current negotiations under the Doha Round either. But, one of the outstanding
issues in the context of the current race for farmland in sub-Saharan Africa is that,
where the food produced in the country of export belongs to a foreign investor's
home state,8 1 an export restriction measure which is, arguably, legitimate under
WTO law may nonetheless amount to a breach of host state's obligation under
international investment law, including BITs. In other words, in the context of
transnational farmland investments, host states' export restriction measures, even
those taken in response to local hunger, cannot be seen isolated from investors'
property rights protected under international investment law, another layer of law
applicable to these investments. The following sub-sections seek to explore this
interface between international trade and investment laws in disciplining export
restrictions relating to foreign farmland investment.
A. Farmland Investment Contracts
Although the notion of 'land grabbing' prominently featuring in the media
reports seems to point to a unilateral appropriation of land by a 'land grabber,' it is
now widely acknowledged that most of the deals are effected through contracts
duly signed by relevant authority and complying with national laws.8 2 As such,
these investment contracts are deemed to represent a compromise between the
different, but not mutually exclusive, interests. 83 It could thus be argued that the
terms of investment contracts should not be much of a concern as host countries
80. Id.
81. As noted before, a significant number of foreign land deals for food production in Ethiopia
and most of sub-Saharan Africa are specifically meant for export of food back home.
82. See generally LORENZO COTULA, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPENT, LAND DEALS IN AFRICA: WHAT IS IN THE CONTRACTS? (2011); Wily, supra note 17.
83. WORLD BANK, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
VOL II: GUIDELINES para. 39 (1992).
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can always re-open them for negotiation. In this respect, Raymond Vernon, from
his study of U.S. multinational corporations' operations abroad in the raw
materials venture in the 1960s, observes that host states often opened up the
ventures for re-negotiation "repeatedly-almost predictably," a phenomenon he
termed "obsolescing bargain",84 Nonetheless, such frequent re-opening of
negotiations in the current situation when foreign investments enjoy expansive
legal protection and informal backup through various channels comes only at the
expense of one nature or another to host states. As such, it is worthwhile to
scrutinize these contracts.
In this regard, Lorenzo Cotula, from his preliminary analysis of selected
farmland investment contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa, alerts that "there are real
concerns that some contracts underpinning the recent wave of land acquisitions
may not be fit for purpose." 85 A number of the contracts reviewed appear to be
"short, unspecific documents that grant long-term rights to extensive areas of
land.",86 Indeed, as Smaller argues, many of the negative impacts of large scale
farmland investments-such as those documented in recent World Bank report 87 _
could have been resolved through better contracts between states and foreign
investors and more robust monitoring and evaluation of projects after the contract
is signed.88
In the context of food security, although agricultural investments can
ostensibly bring yield increases that will benefit food security in both host and
investor countries, if not properly managed, such investments could also have long
term negative impact on food security in host states.89 Particularly, where host
countries themselves experience frequent shortage of food, as for example in the
case of Ethiopia, it is imperative to properly spell out, among others, ways of
distribution of produce between domestic and international markets in the event of
food shortages in the host country. This section will explore how farmland
investment contracts regulate export restrictions under such circumstances.
Depending on the data source used, Ethiopiahas transferred between 300,000
to 3.7 million hectares of farmland to foreign investors, often through long-term
84. See RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF US
ENTERPRISES 46 (1971).
85. COTULA, supra note 82, at 43.
86. Id.
87. The Report by and large positively appraises the practice of large scale farmland investments,
but also notes some negative impacts in relation to access to: land, water, employment, environment,
outgrower schemes, food security, infrastructure, technology transfer, resettlement, and markets. See
generally THE WORLD BANK, THE PRACTICE OF RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES IN LARGER-
SCALE AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT ON
LOCAL COMMUNITIES, REPORT No. 86175-GLB, XIV (2014).
88. Carin Smaller, Foreign Investment in Farmland and Water: 10 Steps for Better Contracts,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (May 14, 2014),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/05/14/foreign-investment-in-farmland-and-water-10-steps-for-better-
contracts.
89. For example, see De Schutter, supra note 12, at 250. See generally, COTULA, supra note 82;
DEININGER ET AL., supra note 9.
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lease (for a period of twenty-five to fifty years). 90 Investment contracts for most of
the farmland leased between 2009 and 2012 are publicly available.91 According to
the terms of the contracts, the lands acquired are meant for production of food
crops, mainly rice, oil seeds, soya, and maize; biofuel crops such as palm oil,
Jatropha curcas, and castor beans; and industrial crops (raw materials), especially,
cotton, and sugar cane. The contracts are generally short, about nine to eleven
pages long, often organized under nineteen to twenty-one articles. Interestingly,
the key terms of the contracts are identical, save for minor differences relating to,
for example, the identity of the parties, size and location of land, and rate of lease,
and still minor variation depending on whether the investor is a foreigner or local.
Apart from activities relating to the cultivation and harvest of the products, 92
the contracts do not envisage what the investor may or may not do with the
harvest. The only limitation the contracts impose on investors in this respect is
that the investor shall not make unauthorized use of the leased land beyond the
predetermined purpose or objective or plan without express consent of the lessor in
writing. 93 Thus, the contracts do not mention the possibility of export restrictions
even under exceptional circumstance where there are local food crises. Indeed,
Esayas Kebede, former Director of the Agricultural Investment Directorate at the
Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture, argues that: "[i]t's not our task to take revenue
away from investors .... [W]e want to increase the purchasing power of our
people so that they can afford to buy corn from Karuturi. If the investors can get a
good price here in this country, they will sell here.'
94
This approach of Ethiopian government seems to emanate from export-
oriented agricultural policy of the country,95 and contrasts with the practice in
some other countries in sub-Saharan Africa region. For example, in examining
selected farmland investment contracts, Cotula notes the Liberian experience of
90. See DEININGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 62 (reporting that total transfers in 2004-09 amounted
to 1.2 million in Ethiopia); Dessalegn Rahmato, The Perils of Development from Above: Land Deals in
Ethiopia, 12 AFR. IDENTITIES 26 (2014) (noting that '[i]t is estimated that the total land ceded to
investors from the mid-1990s to the end of 2011 may be in the order of 3.00-3.5 million hectares.'). See
also THE OAKLAND INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT DEALS IN AFRICA COUNTRY
REPORT: ETHIOPIA 1 (2011) ("Since early 2008, the Ethiopian government has embarked on a process
to award millions of hectares (ha) of land to foreign and national agricultural investors. Our research
shows that at least 3,619,509 ha of land have been transferred to investors, although the actual number
may be higher.").
91. Land Leased Information, ETHIOPIAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (last visited Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.moa.gov.et/web/pages/land-leased.
92. Thus Article 3(4) of the contract(s) provides that, the lessee [investor] has the right to
'[d]evelop and cultivate the land and harvest the crop and carry on all other activities by mechanization
or such other means that the lessee shall in its own discretion deem fit and proper in the circumstances.'
USING PUBLIC FOOD, supra note 77.
93. See USING PUBLIC FOOD, supra note 77, at art. 4(10).
94. See Elias N. Stebek, Between 'Land Grabs' and Agricultural Investment: Land Rent
Contracts with Foreign Investors and Ethiopia's Normative Setting in Focus, 5 MINZAN L. REV. 175,
210 (2011).
95. ETHIOPIAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH AND
TRANSFORMATION PLAN (2009).
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granting the investor the right to export rice "provided domestic consumption
demands are met," whereas, in Madagascar, a contract "determines export and
domestic market quotas for specified crops (rice, wheat, and maize), though all
pulses are for export and the contract allows exceptions where 'situation or
circumstances otherwise demanded.'
96
While reserving the right to export restrictions in farmland contracts-or, as a
matter of fact export restriction itself-may not be a panacea for addressing local
food shortage (in terms of both availability and access), at times, particularly when
there is local food crisis, these measures might be a necessity than optional policy
responses. The fact that these contracts are silent thus evokes doubts as to whether
the issue is seriously taken during the negotiations for transfer of large tracts of
land to foreign investors. In the face of the silence of the investment contracts and
other domestic laws on the issue, which in effect amounts to granting the investor
unconditional right of export, possible export restriction measures by host states
would run the risk of violating contractual commitments. Although disputes over
contractual commitments, as ordinary commercial disputes, are adjudicated within
the framework of domestic laws, depending on the architecture of host states
commitments under other laws applicable to these investments (for example
relevant BITs), the breach of contractual obligations may constitute the breach
international investment law (BIT) entailing international adjudication 97 -which is
never easy to most of the host states in sub-Saharan Africa.
B. International Investment Law and Jurisprudence
Investment laws which offer expansive protection to foreign investments are
assumed to facilitate the flow of foreign investment to host states and ostensibly
promote economic growth and development. 98 Perhaps, the most significant shift
in the protection of foreign investments has been the introduction of BITs in the
late 1950s and 1960s and their phenomenal growth in the decades to follow.
99
BITs, which are now regarded as important source of international investment
law,' 00 impose restraints on the arbitrary exercise of power of host states with
96. COTULA, supra note 82, at 38.
97. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
152-54 (2d ed. 2012).
98. This assumption, however, has been challenged by empirical accounts. For example, see
generally, Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct
Investment? Only a Bit and They Could Bite 20 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper no. 3121,
2003); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VIRG. J. INTL. L. 639, 642-43 (1997). For competing claims, see
generally Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, Do BITs increase FDI in Developing Countries 33 WORLD
DEV. 1567, 3-5 (2005). For mixed claims, see generally KARL P. SAUVANT AND LISA E. SACHS EDS.,
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES,
DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (2009).
99. For a succinct account of the origin and incessant evolution of BITs, see generally Juirgen
Kurtz, The Shifting Landscape of International Investment Law and its Commentary 106 AME. J. INT'L
L. 686 (2012).
100. See generally JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
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respect to foreign investors. These restraints (investors' rights) are also often
enforced through an independent dispute resolution system. 10 1 The introduction of
BITs by countries of the global north was in large measure a counter move to the
emerging claim of capital importing countries for permanent sovereignty over
natural resources and more broadly the establishment of New International
Economic Order ("NIEO").1°2  The complexity and instability of modem
international investment law103 is thus marked with the competing interests of
capital exporting states or their investors and capital importing countries. Clearly,
food security induced transnational farmland deals of recent years are typical
examples of investments involving competing interests of home and host states
that would potentially trigger the application of BITs.
Despite the tendency to introduce more flexibilities to legal regimes of
foreign investment protection in recent years, 10 4 foreign investments (hence
farmland investments) still enjoy a wide range of protection under BITs through
such standards as most favored nation ("MFN"), national treatment, fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security, expropriation, as well as umbrella
clauses which potentially elevate breach of contracts to the breach of BITs
standards.
For example, the 2004 BIT of Ethiopia and Germany provides that: "[a]
Contracting Party shall adhere to any other obligation deriving from a written
commitment undertaken by it in favour of an investor of the other Contracting
Party with regard to an investment in its territory."' 10 5 The implication is that the
violation of farmland investment contracts, which is otherwise a domestic law
issue, could amount to a breach of BIT containing such clauses and hence an
international investment law issue with potential international adjudication-and
associated costs. Even more intriguingly, an umbrella clause in one BIT could,
through the operation of MFN clauses, be extrapolated to the country's other BITs
with no such clauses. Although whether a MFN clause only covers neither
substantive provisions, nor whether it "only allows an investor to invoke
provisions from other investment treaties that are 'compatible in principle' are not
clear from existing arbitral awards, 10 6 the use of MFN clauses to import more
LAW: NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL (2013).
101. Prabhash Ranjan, National Contestation of International Investment Law and International
Rule of Law, RULE OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS: CONTESTATIONS AND
DEFERENCE (Machiko Kanetake & Andrae Nollkaemper eds., forthcoming 2015).
102. For a thorough analysis of this, see generally SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONIZING
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY
(2011).
103. Kurtz, supra note 99, at 689.
104. See generally SURYA P SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY
AND PRINCIPLES (2d ed. 2012).
105. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Eth., art. 8(2),
Jan. 19, 2004, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1 164.
106. See Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, The Significance of South-South BITs for the International
Investment Regime: A Quantitative Analysis, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 101, 127 (2010) (noting that:
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favorable substantive treatment from third country BITs is largely uncontested."°7
The potency of a given BIT's MFN clause to import more favorable conditions
(treatments)-including an umbrella clause-from another BIT, however, depends
on its exact wording as well as the scope of the application of the basic treaty
containing the clause.'0 8 Indeed, there are several cases in which tribunals have
generally allowed investors to "import" substantive provisions from other BITs
entered into by the host state 109(although there have also been cases where such
requests were denied). The Bayindir v. Pakistan tribunal, for instance, allowed the
investor to invoke a fair and equitable treatment clause from another BIT via MFN
clause of the BIT between Turkey and Pakistan. 110 Similarly, the CME v. Czech
Republic tribunal held that the investor could rely on an expropriation provision
from another BIT to determine the standard of compensation."'
This, arguably, implies that, as long as a host country has signed at least one
BIT containing an umbrella clause, all of its other BITs with MFN clauses-
depending on the wording of the clause and the scope of application of the treaty
containing the clause-can import this obligation. Thus, a breach of commitment
for the investor (investment contract) which is otherwise adjudicated in domestic
courts would become a breach of host states commitment to investor's home state
under relevant BIT. As the vast majority of existing BITs permit investors to bring
arbitral claims directly against host states, the operationalization of investment
contracts through BITs could thus lead to costly international adjudication that
most of the host states of the recent transnational agricultural investments hardly
afford. This has important ramification for host states, particularly in the face of
poorly drafted transnational farmland contracts, and hence the tendency to
overlook the challenges the cumulative application of various layers of laws
ordering these farmland deals.
To date, no real case has emerged concerning host states' measures, including
export restrictions, relating to the recent transnational farmland investments within
"Whether the ejusdem generis principle implies that the clause only covers substantive provisions False
[or, whether it] only allows an investor to invoke provisions from other investment treaties that are
'compatible in principle,' and if so, how that applies in terms of limiting its application" is unclear from
existing case law.); see also Subedi, supra note 104.
107. Stephan W. Schill, Mulitilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation
Clauses, 27 BERKELEY. J. INT'L L. 496, 519 (2009).
108. See Jorgen Kurtz, The AFN Standard and Foreign Investment: An Uneasy Fit? 5 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 861, 872-73 (2004) (noting that "The breadth of operation of a particular MFN clause
will depend to some degree on its exact wording in a given investment treaty. The MFN clauses in
most treaties do not use identical language and, as a result, offer potentially different interpretative
options for arbitral tribunals."); see also Schill, supra note 107, at 523 (noting that "the scope of
application of MFN clauses is regularly also restricted indirectly by the scope of application of the basic
treaty itself.").
109. Schill, supra note 107, at 519.
110. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.5. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 206, 225-30 (Nov. 14, 2005),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0074.pdf
111. CME Czech B.V. v. Czech (Neth. v. Czech), Final Award, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law,
497-500 (Mar. 14, 2003), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-FinalOO2.pdf.
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the framework of international investment law-understandably because of the
incipient nature of the investments. This, however, may not imply that no such
case would appear in the future. Given that local food shortage is already there in
many of the sub-Saharan Africa region," 2 such cases likely arise where there is,
shortage of food in investors home states which would want to have a secure
access to such food, or where sales in international markets offer better returns to
investor than host market (or government) offers.
In fact there are investment arbitration cases in different contexts that are
emblematic of how investment arbitration tribunals may deal with host states'
export restriction measures relating to transnational agricultural produces. The
Venezuela Holdings et. al v Venezuela 113 tribunal, for example, found that
Venezuela's production and export curtailments of oil were incompatible with,
among others, the fair and equitable treatment standard of The Netherlands-
Venezuela BIT. 14 In the tribunal's words:
In the Tribunal's opinion, this standard may be breached by frustrating
the expectations that the investor may have legitimately taken into
account when making the investment. Legitimate expectations may
result from specific formal assurances given by the host state in order to
induce investment."15 .... It thus appears that the production and export
curtailments imposed from November 2006 were incompatible with the
Claimants' reasonable and legitimate expectations, and thus breached
the [fair and equitable treatment] standard contained in Article 3(1) of
the BIT."
16
It is thus evident that where the right to freely export (dispose) is recognized
or where there is no reservation to this right under relevant laws or investment
agreements, as is the case in Ethiopia and many other host states, possible export
restriction measures relating to transnational farmland produces likely violate
investment contracts and eventually breach of relevant BIT, even when such
112. Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Int'l Fund for Agric. Dev., & World Food Programme, THE
STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2013: THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF FOOD SSECURITY 8
(2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf (noting that from 2011-2013, sub-Sahara
Africa hosted 222.7 million chronically hungry people (24.8 percent of the total population, which is
the largest proportion in the world)); see also Basic Definitions, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.,
http://www.ecsw.org/resourcecenter/global/world%20hunger/2Oundemutrition/FAO% 2OBasic% 2 0def
initions%20oP/o2OHunger.pdf (according to which undernourishment or chronic hunger is understood
as the status of persons, whose food intake regularly provides less than their minimum energy (dietary)
requirements).
113. See generally Veneza Holdings, B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic ofVenez., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27, Award, (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw401 I.pdf.
114. Id.
115. Id. 256. The Toto v. Lebanon Tribunal, on the other hand, took a broader view when it states
that legitimate expectations "may follow from explicit or implicit representations made by the host
state, or from its contractual commitments." Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, 159 (June 7, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital 1013 .pdf.
116. Venez. Holdings, B.V., ARB/07/27 at 264.
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measures could be primafacie justified under WTO law.
Similarly, the ICSID Tribunal in El Paso v Argentina, 1 7 regarding
Argentina's ban on oil export following the economic crisis of 1999, noted that the
investor's right to freely export could draw either from host state's laws or
investment agreement signed by host state and foreign investor. 118 In the
Tribunal's view, where the host state's law provides for possibilities of export
restrictions, a foreign investor may not be entitled to an absolute right of export." 19
In the Tribunal's words:
Concerning CAPSA [Compafiias Asociadas Petroleras], in the
Tribunal's view, the right to export freely that was granted by law was
not unrestricted. As any right, it was subject to reasonable restrictions
decided by the Government for reasons of public interest, for example in
order to satisfy the domestic market. This was provided for by Article
377 of the Mining Code ....
On the face of it, therefore, if the possibility of export restrictions is envisaged
under relevant domestic law or investment agreement, a host state may legitimately
introduce export restriction measures, provided that the conditions that dictate the
introduction of the measure exist. On the other hand, this ruling also, as in
Venezuela Holdings, suggests that where no reservation to the investor's right to
export freely is envisaged under either investment contract or other laws of the
host state, a restriction of exports runs the risk of interfering with the property right
of an investor often protected under both domestic laws and international
investment law (BITs). The implication for transnational land deals in countries
like Ethiopia is no different. Where neither domestic laws nor farmland
investment contracts provide for the possibility of export restrictions, even by way
of exception, and particularly where the international market offers higher price
than domestic market, the introduction of export restriction measure may constitute
a breach of both investment contract and-through the operation of umbrella
clause-relevant BITs standards.
As the foregoing cases suggest, one of a BITs standards that the introduction
of agricultural export restriction measures likely violate is the fair and equitable
treatment ("FET") standard which, as Rudolph Dolzer rightly observes, is "[t]he
[b]roadest and [m]ost [p]rominent [s]tandard in [i]nvestment [t]reaties.'' That is,
117. See generally El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,




121. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L
L.7, 10 (2013). Based on arbitral jurisprudence, Dolzer identifies certain common elements of fair and
equitable standard: good faith in the conduct of a party, consistency of conduct, transparency of rules,
recognition of the scope and purpose of laws, due process, prohibition of harassment, a reasonable
degree of stability and predictability of the legal system, particularly, recognition of the legitimate
expectation on the part of the investor, arbitrariness and discrimination (even though separate, specific
rules in investment treaties may (or may not) address these concepts). Id. at 15.
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since "legitimate expectations,"-which may derive, among others, from explicit
or implicit representations by the host state, or from its contractual commitments-
is at the center of the fair and equitable standard,
122 the introduction of export
restriction measures-in the absence of reservation of this right in relevant contract
or law at the time of investment-will likely constitutes a prima facie case of
denial of legitimate expectations of the investor, and hence breach of FET
standard. Of course, depending on the nature and effect of export restriction
measure on the investment, other BIT standards such as full protection and
security123 and (indirect) expropriation124 may also be invoked.
Nonetheless, although BITs are often drafted, and interpreted, with more pro-
investor telos, it is possible to accommodate, to some extent, host states' legitimate
regulatory interests through the use of exceptions (general or special). 2 5 Of course,
the wording and hence scope of these clauses varies from one instrument to
another, as does their interpretation by investment tribunals even when their
formulations and the factual circumstances surrounding a given set of cases are
122. Id. at 17 (noting that: "The protection of legitimate expectations by the FET standard will
today properly be considered as the central pillar in the understanding and application of the FET
standard.").
123. While most BITs employ the term 'full protection and security' or 'adequate protection and
security,' others employs its variants, for example Ethiopia-Finland BIT of 2006 provides for 'constant
protection and security' while Ethiopia-Austria BIT of 2004 employ 'full and constant protection and
security'. In its classical understanding, 'full protection and security' is understood as host state's
obligation of due diligence in relation to the physical protection of the investment, although tribunals
have also construed the norm as one extending to ensuring both physical safety of and legal security for
foreign investment. See Roland Kldger, "FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT" IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 293-94 (2011). Klager further notes that "a guarantee of full protection and security
seems to add little to a fair and equitable treatment clause in an investment agreement." Id. at 295; see
also Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Full Protection and Security, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC Law 183, 212 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) (noting that: "Often, the ultimate
outcome may not differ strongly, as one tribunal may assess under the 'fair and equitable treatment'
clause what another considers under an FPS clause. But the lack of consistency nevertheless risks
undermining the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration.").
124. Where export restriction measure in question potentially neutralizes the property rights of the
investor, or investor's control over his investment, the measure could arguably amount to indirect
expropriation. The 'sole effect doctrine' as a criterion has been a dominant test in establishing the
existence of indirect expropriation (as opposed to legitimate non-compensable regulatory measure). See
Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. Envt'l L.J. 64, 81-81 (2002).
Although some tribunals have also paid due regard to the cause (nature and context) of the measure as
important criterion to determine indirect expropriation (for example, LG&E v. Argentina), it appears
that the effect of the measure (how severely the investment has been interrupted?) is still an important,
although not necessarily the only, test. See also Markus Perkams, The Concept of Indirect
Expropriation in Comparative Public Law-Searching for Light in the Dark, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 107, 111 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010). Perkams
identifies three general approaches (sole effect, exclusion of non-discriminatory bona fide regulations,
and weighing the public interest protected against the effect of the measure) to establishing indirect
expropriation and notes that: "None of these tests is currently prevailing and it is hard to predict how a
tribunal will approach the issue of indirect expropriation." Id. at 110.
125. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Rebalancing Through Exceptions, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 449,
449-50 (2012).
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similar. General exceptions, those applying to all of the obligations of a BIT, are
often formulated in terms of "essential security interests," 126 although some BITs
also employ alternative formulations including "public security" and "public
order."' 127 Special exceptions, on the other hand, apply only to a limited number of
BIT obligations-most commonly national and most favored nation treatment
obligations. 
128
The question to ask is, then, to what extent can BITs' exception clauses
(measures) be employed to justify food export restrictions on ground of local food
crisis (food insecurity)? Since special exceptions, as noted before, commonly
pertain to most favored nation treatment (how a given foreign investor is treated
vis-h-vis other comparable foreign investors) and national treatment (how a given
foreign investor is treated vis-A-vis comparable domestic investors), they are more
about ensuring non-discrimination in the application of a given measure than
whether the introduction of the measure itself is justified in the first place. So, in
the absence of any special exception on ground of, say food security (to date, not
many, if any, BITs seems to have expressly envisaged this), 129 one would only
look at general exceptions for guidance. Thus, could general exceptions-
commonly referring to measures aimed at protecting "national security, public
security or public order," 130 "public security and order,"'131 and "essential security
interests" 132 of a party-be invoked to justify host state's export restriction
126. Id. at 449.
127. Other formulations include: measures aimed at protecting human, animal, and plant life and
health; environmental measures; measures to fulfill a party's obligations with respect to the
maintenance of international peace and security; measures with respect to financial services taken for
prudential reasons; measures related to monetary or exchange rate policies; measures of taxation; and
measures to promote cultural or linguistic diversity. Id. at 449-50. See, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING
WORLD 99 (2007) (noting that exceptions on ground of essential security interests may at times apply to
specific treaty obligations-such as expropriation/nationalization, non-discrimination, dispute settlement,
and application of host-country-law to foreign investment-and in that sense become a special exception
clauses as opposed to general exception).
128. Vandevelde, supra note 125, at 449-50.
129. See, e.g., Christian Hfiberli & Fiona Smith, Food Security and Agri-Foreign Direct
Investment in Weak States: Finding the Governance Gap to Avoid "Land Grab, " 77 MOD. L. REV. 189,
221 (2014). Haberli and Smith propose a public interest clause for food security:
In view of the specific situation of weak host states, their strong international commitments
under BITs and other instruments, and comparing these commitments with the soft law
principles applicable to home states and investors, we conclude our analysis in this article
with a proposal for a public interest clause for food security which could be incorporated into
the binding commitments of the host state and the investor, either in a BIT or regional treaty.
Id.
130. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments,U.K.-Eth.; Nov. 19, 2009,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/l 180.
131. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, supra
note 105.
132. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of
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measures taken in response to local food crisis (food insecurity)?
The answer to this question is far from straightforward. One source of
difficulty has to do with the interpretation of the aforementioned terms (subjects)
of treaty exception. Indeed, as Arnold Wolfers cautions, "political formulas" like
national security "may not mean the same thing to different people" and "may not
have any precise meaning at all." 133 In the context of international investment law,
there have been limited instances in which arbitral tribunals have grappled with the
interpretation of these terms. One such instance was in the aftermath of
Argentina's financial crisis of 2000-2001when a number of foreign investors
brought arbitral claims against Argentina's regulatory response to the crisis. In its
defence, Argentina attempted to justify its measures, among others, through
invocation of "public order" and "essential security interests" exceptions to its BIT
obligations. Nonetheless, as for example, Jtirgen Kurtz's analysis of the first five
of these awards reveals, "[the] rulings engage fundamentally different and at times
conflicting methods of interpreting the relationship between the operative treaty
exception and relevant customary law."'
' 34
The Continental Tribunal, which largely ruled in favour of Argentina on its
invocation of treaty exception, 135 for instance-by dismissing the claimant's
submission that public order is synonymous with public policy which more
narrowly refers "to measures necessary to maintain the public policies, laws and
morals that define the country's society"' 36-interpreted "public order" instead as
a broad synonym for "public peace," "which can be threatened by actual or
potential insurrections, riots and violent disturbances of the peace . . . [including]
due to significant economic and social difficulties."' 37 Viewed in this light, where
food crisis (shortage) in host state results in, among others, riots or other
disturbances that may threaten the legal order (rule of law) in a host country-as
for example widely seen following the 2007-2008 food crisis-a response through
export restriction could be justified through the invocation of "public order" treaty
exception, provided of course that the restriction is necessary in the circumstances.
Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Israel for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Eth.-Isr., Nov. 26, 2003,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1 167.
133. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 481, 481
(1952).
134. Jorgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, Public
Order and Financial Crisis, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 334 (2010).
135. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award, 160, 319 (Sept 5,
2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita02 2 8.pdf. Among the other four
Tribunals, three (CMS, Enron and Sempra) Tribunals ruled against Argentina while the LG&E Tribunal
partially finds in favour of Argentina on its invocation of the exceptions. Kurtz, supra note 134, at 333.
136. Cont'l Cas. Co., ARB/03/9 171.
137. Id. 174. Although the Continental tribunal considers 'public order' exception as distinct
from 'essential security interests' exception, as UNCTAD notes, whether 'public order' exception is
more directed towards disturbances of the internal legal order or whether it covers any kind of threat to
national security is not clear from exiting arbitral awards. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., THE
PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN IIAs 74 (2009).
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This brings the discussion to the other commonly used general BIT
exceptions: "national security" or "essential security interests," and particularly to
the question whether host states' agricultural export restriction measures could be
justified under these exceptions. As a starting point, whether "essential security
interests" and "national security" refer to the same thing or whether they are
significantly different is not clear from existing case law. However, as the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") argues, given the prefix
"essential", "essential security interests" could be "narrower than the more general
term "national security."' 138 However, whether Contracting Parties, by choosing
one of these alternatives, actually intend to introduce such a distinction is far from
obvious. 139 Further, and perhaps more importantly, whether the notion of essential
security interests is confined to its traditional understanding of a state's measures
directed to counter external threats, often military, to its territorial integrity or
whether it also captures the more evolving notion of human security is also not
self-evident. 140
Human Security is the latest in a long series of attempts to broaden traditional
conceptions of security-other such attempts include: global security, societal
security, common security, comprehensive security and cooperative security. 14 1
The notion was first articulated in the 1994 United Nations Development
Programme ("UNDP") Human Development Report which called for the
broadening of the conception of security "from an exclusive stress on territorial
security to a much greater stress on people's [human] security," which
encompasses seven different dimensions: economic, food, health, environmental,
personal, community, and political security. 142 Indeed, about two decades later-
building on the works of the U.N. Commission on Human Security-the U.N.
General Assembly passed a Resolution that aims at creating a common
understanding on the notion of human security. 143 The Resolution conceptualizes
the notion as, inter alia, "[t]he right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free
from poverty and despair" 144 and as one calling for "people-centred,
comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen
the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities."'' 45 Further,
the Resolution concedes that "Human security does not replace State security."' 14 6
As BITs exception clauses often employ "national security" and "essential security
interests," instead of human security, the task of interpreting these clauses either
narrowly-with a focus on territorial integrity-or broadly-in line with the
138. Id. at 72-73.
139. Id. at 73.
140. See also Kurtz, supra note 134, at 361-63.
141. Keith Krause, Policy Paper, Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda, 26 GENEVA
CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES 1 (2007).
142. U.N. Dev. Programme, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994 24 (1994).






evolving notion of human security-is left for tribunals. The Continental
Tribunal, for example, seems to have taken the latter approach when it considered
the effects of the economic crisis (such as near collapse of the domestic economy,
the leap in unemployment, the immediate threats to the health of young children,
the sick and the most vulnerable) would qualify as a situation in which the
essential security of Argentina as a state and country was vitally at stake.'
47
Thus, arguably, a case can also be made of shortage of food as a 'security'
matter. As Lester R. Brown argues, for example, "[i]t is no longer possible to
separate food security and security more broadly defined;, 148 indeed, the security
equation is simple: "by denying access to food, life can be threatened."'149 Thus, a
situation in which the acuteness of local food shortage threatens lives may trigger
the invocation of "essential security interests" and "national security" treaty
exception to justify host state's possible response measures such as export
restrictions. For, while export restrictions may not guarantee access to food, it can
by enhancing local food availability, contribute towards access. Nonetheless,
current "understanding of food as a matter of security remain ad hoc."' 5 ° Neither
has this nexus, food as a matter of 'security,' found its way into hard international
law to aid tribunals engaging with the interpretation of treaty exception. Indeed, if
BITs exception clauses are to be interpreted in the light of the parties' obligations
under other international agreements-as mandated by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") 5 '-host state's duty to realize its people's right to
adequate food under the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR") 152 could create the food "essential security interests" link.
153
This approach seems appealing, if also raises a more complex issue of the interplay
between international investment and human rights law, which is beyond the scope
of this work; the extent to which tribunals are willing to take this road, however, is
not clear from existing case law. It is also worth mentioning that, even where food
shortage (insecurity) maybe understood as a threat to the essential security interests
of the host state invoking a treaty exception, it is still incumbent upon that state to
prove the existence of the condition (food shortage) that triggers the measure (in
147. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award, 180 (Sept 5, 2008),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita02 2 8.pdf.
148. Lester R. Brown, FULL PLANET, EMPTY PLATES: THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF FOOD SCARCITY
121 (2012).
149. Peter Wallensteen, Scarce Goods as Political Weapons: The Case of Food, 13 J. PEACE RES.
277, 277 (1976).
150. See Tim Siegenbeek van Heukelom, Food as Security: The Controversy of Foreign
Agricultural Investment in the Yala Swamp, Kenya 77 (Aug. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Sydney) (on file with University of Sydney).
151. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT], which requires a treaty interpreter to take into account "[a]ny relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties."
152. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
153. Kurtz, for example, suggests similar interpretative approach in the context of analysing
tribunals' ruling on Argentina's invocation of 'essential security interests' exception to justify its
regulatory responses to the economic crisis. See Kurtz, supra note 134, at 363-64.
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this case, export restriction) and that the measure is a necessary response that is
applied only until the condition demands so.
54
That said, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa-for example Ethiopia-
though, most of the BITs do not provide for exception clauses: Ethiopia's BITs
with Algeria, Austria, China, Iran, Libya, North Sudan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain,
Russia, Sweden, Yemen, The Netherlands, and Turkey, for example do not provide
for any general-public order and security-exception clause.1 55  And absent
express exception treaty clauses, it is unlikely that tribunals would seriously
engage with the task of rebalancing the interests of the investor and host state.
Indeed, as for example Dolzer contends, such an engagement would even be
inappropriate.156 Also, as noted before, even when the exceptions are envisaged in
BITs, the interpretative approach a given tribunal takes is far from certain,
although there is a general tendency for a pro-investor finding. The upshot is,
potential export restriction measures applied to transnational agricultural
investments in response to local food crisis-even when justified under the WTO
law-can nonetheless be challenged under international investment law (BITs)
which points to, inter alia, a limited policy space of host states as well as
incoherence between the two strands of international economic law (trade and
investment) in addressing the competing food (security) interests of host and
investor countries.
V. CONCLUSION
The convergence of global food, energy, and financial crises in recent years
has triggered a surge of interest in acquisitions of farmland in many parts of the
world, but most notably in sub-Saharan Africa, with important implications for,
among others, access to land, food and water. It is thus very important to examine
relevant laws that, at least along with other set of factors, are ordering this process
and its potential outcomes. This article has analysed how international economic
law-mainly WTO law and international investment laws-mediates the outcome
of transnational agricultural investments with a particular focus on export
restrictions which have been one of the push factors for these investments.
Although export restriction measures may not be a panacea to ensure food
availability and access, under certain circumstances these measures still remain
relevant policy options for host states of transnational agricultural investments,
such those in sub-Saharan Africa which are often themselves facing frequent food
insecurity (hunger) challenges. Nonetheless, as shown in this article, the WTO law
and international investment law seem to differ in terms of constraining host states'
ability to introduce and maintain export restriction measures.
154. See, e.g., Kurtz supra note 134, at 364-65; see also Vandevelde, supra note 125, at 456.
155. See also Vandevelde, supra note 125, at 451 (noting that a "majority of BITs do not yet
contain any general exceptions, albeit special exceptions applicable to the national and most-favored-
nation treatment provisions are extremely common.").
156. See Dolzer, supra note 121, at 28 (noting that: "BITs are drafted in a one-sided manner with
the aim to provide an investor-friendly climate and to attract foreign investors; absent a special treaty
clause, a rebalancing of interests in the case of a dispute by a tribunal would not be appropriate.").
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Although the WTO law generally prohibits quantitative restrictions, by way
of exception, it allows Members to introduce "[e]xport prohibitions or restrictions
temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other
products essential to the exporting contracting party"1 57 -in compliance with the
consultation and notification requirements under the AoA 1 58 In the light of the
indeterminate and subjective nature of the above key terms defining the conditions
that trigger the operation of this exception clause, procedural requirements of
consultation and notification that can easily be eschewed, and the absence of limit
to the use of export taxes (that otherwise have similar effect to quantitative
restrictions), the WTO law leaves Members with a considerable degree of
autonomy to introduce export restriction measures. Indeed, this remains the case
despite the increasing call for stricter disciplines on agricultural export restrictions
in recent years, both within the WTO-Doha Round of trade negations-and other
multilateral settings.
However, a different picture of host states' autonomy in terms of introducing
export restrictions emerges in the context of transnational national agricultural
investments which are further subject to international investment law. Although
no case involving export restriction measures relating to the recent transnational
agricultural investments has been reported yet-understandably because of the
incipient nature of these investments-a closer look at WTO law disciplines in the
light of international investment law and practice suggests that WTO flexibilities
on export restrictions on ground of food security may not stand up to foreign
investors rights under investment laws agreements. Indeed, some of the reviewed
farmland investment contracts do not envisage the possibility of export restrictions.
And absent such reservation, the introduction of export restriction-depending on
its impact on the property right of the investor-risks the breach of relevant BITs
between host and home states. This is particularly the case given the fact that most
of the host states such those in sub-Saharan Africa have signed at least one BIT
with an umbrella clause that potentially elevates the violation of farmland
commercial contract to breach of a BIT, which entails costly international
arbitration that these states hardly afford. Even more disconcertingly, this effect of
umbrella clause could be imported to host state's other BITs, without umbrella
clause, by virtue of the MFN clause which features in virtually every BIT. Neither
does the rebalancing of the interests of host state and foreign investor through BITs
exception clauses on ground of, for example, "essential security interests" of a host
state seem promising either because these clauses are not there, or even when there
is one, how investment tribunal interpret it is far from certainty. This suggests that,
even an export restriction measure that is prima facie justified under WTO law can
nonetheless be challenged under international investment law applicable to
transnational agricultural investments. Thus, while there might be near-consensus
on the claim that the WTO discipline on agricultural export restriction is loose,
transnational agricultural investments could be subject to stricter export restriction
157. GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI(2)(a) (emphasis added).
158. See AoA, supra note 31, at art. 12.
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disciplines in a manner that inhibits hosts states ability to respond even to local
hunger. Apart from undermining host states policy space, this also points to
international economic law's challenge to coherently mediate competing food
(in)security concerns.
